© Copyright: James Jope
Approaches to Lucretius: Traditions and Innovations in Reading the De Rerum Natura
[DRN] (2020, ed. Donncha O’Rourke) evolved from a conference on
Lucretius in Theory at the University of Edinburgh in 2013. The
innovations comprise a sampling of diverse critical theories employed in
the study of Lucretius (as well as other classical authors) in recent
decades. O’Rourke’s excellent introduction sketches the history of this
scholarship and gives not only a summary, but some interesting
additional information for each essay. The chapters are roughly grouped
according to method: Author and Reader (“vaguely narratology”),
atomology (after Friedländer), allusion (by an author) and
intertextuality (perceived by the reader–although usually intended by
the author). David Sedley did not contribute to the present volume, but
should be mentioned as an eminence grise; several essays allude to or
discuss his thesis that DRN is derived solely from Epicurus’ Peri Physeos. Sedley’s work might be classed as Quellenforschung (searching
out source texts) albeit with the novel feature that the supposed
source text is not fully extant and has to be reconstructed.
The
most traditional essay–so much so that it seems to stand apart in this
collection, showing, as it were, how classicists had to work up the text
from the extant manuscripts before the literary theorists could amuse
themselves with it–is an exemplary study in textual criticism. In Critical Responses to the Most Difficult Textual Problem in Lucretius,
David Butterfield tackles the issue of the opening hymn to Venus
followed by its apparent disavowal. First he sketches the problems in
the manuscript tradition and scholarly debate since the Renaissance,
then argues logically and systematically to his own solution: He
postulates that there must have been a marginal note pointing out the
correct Epicurean doctrine in the lost manuscript copied by our
archetype, which the archetype then incorporated into the main text.
Regrettably, Butterfield also exhibits nearly rude impatience,
describing rival arguments as, e,g, “rhetorical bluster” (p. 30) or
“perverse” (p. 34)–a propensity which has not been uncommon in the long
history of textual criticism.
In Reading the ‘Implied Author’ in Lucretius’ DRN,
Nora Goldschmidt applies Wayne Booth’s concept of the ‘implied author’.
After Roland Barthes murdered ‘The Author’, leaving ‘The Reader’ in
control of the text, Booth assisted The Reader by suggesting an ‘Implied
Author’. Like the ‘persona’ or the ‘narrator’, the implied
author has, of course, nothing to do with Titus Lucretius Carus; rather,
it is the overall impression created by the reading of the text.
Goldschmidt considers three apparently autobiographical passages about
writing the DRN. Noting the ‘labor’ and ‘furor’ associated
with composing a Latin poetic expression of Epicureanism, she
surprisingly infers that Lucretius did not have peace of mind , i.e., he
betrays an element of anti-Lucrèce. This is strange, because no
matter how we translate these words, it seems clear from the context
that Lucretius enjoyed his work. But surely the overall impression after
reading the entire DRN is the static pleasure of contemplating the
cosmic cycle with a new understanding.
Barnaby Taylor’s Common Ground in Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura
resembles close reading, but not of a continuous passage. Rather, he
examines short passages throughout the text which use the first person
plural. Differentiating inclusive (the reader is part of ‘we’),
exclusive (the reader is not part of ‘we’) and collective (reader and
author belong to some larger group) uses, he shows persuasively how
Lucretius’ didactic technique of “mutual exploration... between...
teacher and student” works differently but effectively for both
uninitiated beginners and fully instructed Epicureans.
The concept of ‘distributed cognition’ in Coming to Know Epicurus’ Truth: Distributed Cognition in Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura by
Fabio Tutrone comes from Cognitive Science. It refers to the modern
view (as opposed to Cartesian dualism) that knowledge does not reside
solely inside the mind; rather, it involves the external world in
connection with the brain. It is probably fairly obvious to students of
epicureanism that the atomist theory of mind and the senses falls into
this category. Tutrone is more concerned with convincing ‘cognitive
scientists’, who, like so many modern intellectuals, like to assume that
they had no ancient predecessors. His case is strong, but his
determination to express it in cognitive scientists’ terms is
embarrassing: “[the] DRN... is construed by Lucretius as a distributed
cognitive artefact” (p. 94). While historical scholars will be shocked
by the anachronism, “death of the author” enthusiasts may find its
attribution to the intention of Titus Lucretius Carus disappointing.
In
an important digression, Tutrone persuasively defends the ‘realist’
view of Epicurean gods (they exist) against the ‘idealist’ view (they
are mental constructs).
Infinity, Enclosure and False Closure in Lucretius’De Rerum Natura
is the editor’s own contribution. After discussing the comprehensible
and incomprehensible aspects of the concept of infinity, he suggests
some ways in which Lucretius’ poetry conveys a sense of infinity: for
example, the ‘endless’ series of proofs of the mortality of the soul,
which “seems to go on forever”. O’Rourke draws on various sources from
Ovid to Umberto Eco, but not, as far as I know, on any particular school
of literary criticism. Although he does show a deeper understanding of
the philosophical issue than some classicists, this is essentially a
standard piece of classical scholarship, and a good one.
Lucretian Echoes: Sound as Metaphor for Literary Allusion in De Rerum Natura:
Jason Nethercut proposes a neat instance of the epicurean principle
that poetic form and content should correlate. Previous scholars have
noticed allusions to the Homeric Hymn to Pan and later texts in
Lucretius’ discussion of echo in 4.549-94, but Nethercut argues that
Lucretius makes those later texts ‘echo’ the Hymn. His argument is
rather speculative and owes much to others (Philodemus, Schiescaro). Can
it be backed up by similar passages elsewhere in DRN? The more are
found, the stronger the case. Nethercut’s conclusion seems to recognize
this.
Saussure’s cahiers and Lucretius’ elementa: A Reconsideration of the Letters–Atoms Analogy:
Wilson
H. Shearin calls for a reconsideration of the dominant interpretations
of the analogy famously explored by Friedländer between the many ways in
which atoms/letters can combine to form different compounds/words. His
point–without Saussure–is that the dominant views miss some implications
of the analogy, in particular the creative potentiality of the atoms
suggested by Lucretius’ term genitalia corpora. A point well taken.
Unfortunately, he proposes as a model of creative potential Saussure’s
so-called ‘anagrams’, an admittedly arbitrary “game” to find theme words
hidden in the text. Thus, from
. . sed Eo magiS acrem
inritat animi virtutem, effringere ut arta
natURaE Primus portarum claustra CUPIret. (DRN I 69-71)
the
eminent Swiss sorcerer conjured Epicurus’ name. It is sad to see an
intelligent scholar turning to such frivolity for inspiration.
Arguing over Text(s): Master-Texts vs. Intertexts in the Criticism of Lucretius by
A.
D. Morrison describes two kinds of readers who regard Lucretius’ use of
his sources in different ways. ‘Master text’ sources are considered
superordinate and the epigone is checked against them. This approach is
more common among philosophers, and David Sedley’s thesis positing Peri Physeos
as Lucretius’ source text is an example. Intertextuality is the
dominant approach among students of Latin poetry, who see their authors
as responding to, perhaps even correcting, his source texts. Morrison
wishes to avoid polemics and concludes that the DRN can accommodate
diverse readers. However, he shows that it does make a difference, and
he notes that Roman readers themselves (e.g., Ovid) engaged more in
intertextuality. This paper is actually a kind of ‘meta-scholarship’,
reflecting on the assumptions implicit in different critical
approaches–a beneficial and productive exercise that should happen more
often.
Lucretius and the Philosophical Use of Literary Persuasion by Tim O’Keefe: In spite of the unconventional professorial image on Tim’s home page,
this is a sober attempt to defend Lucretius’ originality by modulating
some influential positions which tend to diminish it. First, O’Keefe
argues that the debate over whether Lucretius only copied from Epicurus
(Sedley looms here once again) or tailored his arguments against
contemporary (esp. Stoic) sources can not be resolved, because the
source texts are lacking and because Lucretius favored ‘catch-all’
arguments directed at anyone who shared a given position. Then he
considers the poet’s use of emotive images and ridicule, which Martha
Nussbaum would class with Epicureans’ irrational indoctrination
practices. Comparing Cicero, who shows his originality by intervening in
his dialogues, O’Keefe argues that Lucretius uses such moves only to
remove popular Roman psychological barriers to his arguments, not to
replace the reasoning. “In his use of literary and rhetorical methods of
persuasion alongside his argumentation, Lucretius alone among the
Epicureans shows a sensitivity for needing to present his arguments in a
way that also takes into account the biases, stereotypes, and other
psychological factors that hinder his audience from accepting the
healing gospel of Epicurus.” Whether this constitutes philosophical
originality is disputable, but it certainly means that Lucretius was
what he set out to be–a first-rate popularizer.
The Rising and Setting Soul in Lucretius, De Rerum Natura: Emma Gee draws an intriguing comparison between Lucretius on souls and Cicero in his Aratea
on stars, studying “the interaction of Lucretius’ text with Cicero’s”
in its effect on the reader. Lucretius, she argues, subverts Cicero’s
and other Stoic texts to which he alludes by altering their
philosophical orientation.
This is an intertextual study. There seem to be two major differences between Quellenforschung and intertextuality: (1) Quellenforschung is old and therefore bad, and intertextuality is new and therefore good;
(2) Intertextuality involves not only the authors, but especially The
Reader. There is, however, a question about intertextuality which
puzzles me: Is The Reader a contemporary Roman or a modern polymath?
Granted that ancient authors, and Roman poets in particular, read,
mined, and strove to upstage their predecessors, can we really assume
that they always thought of the same allusions seen by the scholar?
Some of the verbal echoes cited by Gee are rare outside of the compared texts, but others are not. For example, Cicero’s quarum ego nunc nequeo tortos evolvere cursus becomes Lucretius’ quorum ego nunc nequeo caecas exponere causas.
The echo effect depends mainly on the first four words, which are
common words and likely to be combined in this way for metrical reasons.
Like Nethercut’s essay, this would benefit from further instances.
Was Memmius a Good King? by Joseph Farrell:
If researching historical background to better understand literature is
a ‘method’, classicists have been using it before, during, and after
its discouragement by New Critics (remember them?). Astutely combining
historical expertise and literary sensitivity, Farrell compares DRN with
Philodemus’ treatise on how to be a good king, by investigating their
addressees. Piso was a successful politician, and Philodemus was his
dependent (cliens). Memmius was Lucretius’ equal in the Roman social
hierarchy and a failure. That is why his teacher is much less indulgent
than Piso’s. Farrell even “would not exclude the possibility that
Lucretius chose Memmius as his addressee precisely because Memmius’
behaviour reflected so badly not just on himself but on the entire Roman
political class, particularly in their relaxed attitude towards living
the philosophies that they claimed to espouse.” (239) A notable example
of the above ‘astute combination’ concerns DRN 3.992-3, where Tityos is in amore iacentem while
having his innards savaged in Hades as punishment for attempting to
rape Leto. This, of course, happened only after his crime. The image during the
punishment is grotesquely inappropriate. But Lucretius wishes to
allegorize the myth as representing the pain of passion... because
sexual misconduct played a major part in Memmius’ downfall.
A Tribute to a Hero: Marx’s Interpretation of Epicurus in his Dissertation by
Elizabeth Asmis is a ‘reception’study, i.e., it concerns the influence
of classical authors later in history and in our day. ‘Reception’ has
become fashionable partly because it helps classicists keep their jobs,
but the reason why it is really needed is clear from Asmis’ observation
that “Marx’s dissertation has received much attention from students of
Marxism. There has been very little attention, on the other hand, from
students of ancient philosophy.” (241-2) Marx’s interpretation takes the
random ‘swerve’ of the atoms as the key to free consciousness, which,
evolving along enigmatic Hegelian paths, ultimately surpasses concrete
reality. Asmis follows carefully, tracing Hegel’s influence and
comparing modern scholarship and ancient evidence, to sift out what is
valuable in Marx’s insight. Having consulted her scholarship over the
years, I would have thought her well suited for this delicate task, and I
am not disappointed.
Plato and Lucretius on the Theoretical Subject
by Duncan F. Kennedy offers a critical view of Epicureanism based on
its supposed resemblance to Plato, which is well presented rhetorically
but so unsound that I must resort to a more polemical style to describe
it.
Comparing Plato’s Cave myth with Lucretius’ image of
Epicurus as heroic, Kennedy concludes that both philosophies are
“metaphysical” because they claim to know the ultimate nature of ‘being’
(viz., the Ideas for Plato and the atoms for Epicurus) on the authority
of a privileged reporter or prophet. This definition of ‘metaphysics’
muddles the critical difference: Atomism is verifiable, at least in
principle, albeit not yet with ancient technology; the Ideas are not.
Metaphysics, Kennedy continues, is associated with violence, which he finds in the image of religio trodden under foot. But what about the goal of ataraxia
(peace of mind)? Apart from the indoctrination alleged by
Nussbaum–itself very mild compared with the history of religions–the
closest Epicureanism comes to violence is in its calm acceptance of the
self-inflicted troubles of the ignorant (suave mari magno etc.) Using the metaphorical image of defeated religio to label Epicureanism as violent is simply not fair.
Kennedy
finds in Plato a model of thinking as dialogue, and sees the same model
in Lucretius because of the way in which the poet often addresses his
reader. What about the entire tradition of didactic poetry going back to
the presocratics, and Lucretius’ place in it, which Monica Gale has
explored so well?
The weakness of these arguments is hardly
compensated by the array of authorities cited, from Socrates to Hannah
Arendt. The most prominent of these is Latour, cited as surpassing
Lucretius and metaphysics because he “suggests” precisely fifteen (15)
different modes of ‘being’. His philosophy too is unconvincing, at least
as presented here.
I am indebted to Donncha O’Rourke and his
contributors for the opportunity to refresh my acquaintance with
Lucretian scholarship through these intriguing essays.
Comments? Questions? jamesjope@jamesjope.ca
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