Phillip Mitsis, “The Institutions of Hellenistic Philosophy”, Chapter 27 in A Companion to the Hellenistic World, ed. Andrew Erskine (Blackwell 2005)
Phillip
Mitsis attempts to improve our understanding of Hellenistic
philosophical ‘schools’ with a critical review of certain
speculative descriptions of them, particularly Martha Nussbaum’s
apt, but overdrawn, comparison of the Epicureans, whose teaching was
strictly therapeutic, with the authentic research of the
Aristoteleans. Mitsis repeatedly reminds us of important differences
between modern universities and ancient ‘schools’, which lacked
any permanent infrastructure or financial support, and of the
sparsity of our evidence on these questions. He prefers to regard the
Hellenistic sects as simply “schools of thought”, whose success
relied on the personal relationships between students and teachers,
their mutual admiration, differences, shared intellectual convictions
and rivalries.
The
criticism of speculative characterizations of the schools is timely
and effective; and the suggestion that intellectual inquiry was a
paramount feature of Hellenistic ‘schools’ (as it should be of
any school of philosophy) is cogent. However, Mitsis’ analysis does
not consider an important factor: Given the absence of institutional
support, what indeed was the source of the schools’ income, and
what effect did it have on their doctrines and practices?
Mitsis
asks his reader to imagine the different circumstances of Hellenistic
compared to modern philosophical environments, and what those
differences entail. Well, then, let the tenured professsor imagine an
environment in which financial resources come only from the master’s
own personal wealth, from private patrons, and students’ fees,
without even a concept of academic freedom. Actually he need not look
very far. The current academic situation in many North American
universities, where teaching is done by underpaid instructors on
contract, where a position which ‘offends’ any group can endanger
their career, and where universities may be governed by churches
which do not hesitate to censor what is taught, indicates an
incipient shift towards such an environment.
As
always, our evidence is sparse. Apparently Roman patronage was
especially hazardous. In a paper posted on Academia.edu, Marietta
Horster (Small-minded, Envious and Chauvinistic: The Self-shaping
of Roman Intellectuals), drawing
on the satires of Lucian and Juvenal, concludes that there was “not
enough money and not enough patrons for the many... philosophers”:
It was “a highly competitive situation” (p. 201). And further,
that “most... were not worth the money invested in them”.
Juvenal, and especially Lucian, were targeting mediocre
post-Hellenistic epigones. But as early as the second century b.c.e.
the Stoic Panaetius sanitized early Stoic ethics for his Scipionic
patron. Although Epicureans were supposed to stay out of politics
altogether, Philodemus skilfully composed the best advice he could,
given the school’s constraints, for his politically active Roman
patron. Musonius Rufus adapted Stoic living to suit his wealthy Roman
students. There is even epigraphic evidence of Epicureans who sought
financial security by becoming priests. (For references to these
instances see my paper on “Platonic and Roman Influence on Stoic
and Epicurean Sexual Ethics”, Chapter 25 in A Companion
to Greek and Roman Sexualities,
ed. Thomas K. Hubbard, Wiley Blackwell 2014.)
Mitsis’s
wholesome intellectual environment and Horster’s circus of
charlatans are probably both true aspects of the ancient reality.
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